Explosion in FCC Unit
La Mède, France, Total, 1992
Summar data:
Date: November 9, 1992
Place: La Mède, South of France
Type of accident: Gas release from the gas
plant followed by lots of explosions
Outcome: 6 deaths (workers), 38 injured, 2
hectares damage (control room, Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit and surrounding
process units. Loss about $600 million (facilities repair: 64%, loss of
production: 34%).
View of the fire during the accident (source:
AFP)
What
happened?
At 05:20 on
the morning of November 9, a major explosion occurred at the FCCU (Fluid
catalytic cracking unit) at Total’s La Mede refinery, in southern France.
Six
operators were killed, three of whom were in the control room, which collapsed.
Three others were seriously injured.
Little
contamination of the environment was reported as most of the water used to
extinguish the fires was collected and treated and the superficial
contamination of the lake was contained. No air contamination was measured.
The FCCU
and surrounding process units were severely damaged, resulting in the whole
refinery being shut down for several months, with the FCCU taking a year to
rebuild. Damage to property was reported in the town of Martigues, 4.5 km
(almost 3 miles) away. The total cost of the incident was around $600 million.
Red dots indicate where people died and green
ones where people were injured
Why?
How?
The
incident arose from a release of about 15 tons of hydrocarbons when a hole of
about 25 cm² in area, created through corrosion, suddenly appeared in a 200 mm
absorber stripper reflux cooler bypass line. The release occurred over about 10
minutes creating a large vapor cloud of 14 000m², which engulfed other process
units.
Hole in the bypass line
When the
cloud ignited, after touching the heater 100m away, the resulting overpressure
caused massive damage to the plant and equipment and collapsed the roof on the
process control room, killing 3 of the occupants and injured the others.
A massive
fire created a major domino effect that led to further loss of containment and
escalation. In addition to the FCCU gas recovery plant, four main areas were
affected: a main pipe rack, a building containing a turbine generator, a 2500
m3 spent caustic soda tank containing a layer of light hydrocarbon, and a 5000
m3 fuel oil tank.
Although
the fires in the turbine building and tankage were quickly extinguished, other
areas were allowed to burn under control for 3 days until their sources of fuel
were exhausted.
The control
room was built in 1953, and had not been retrospectively blast protected.
View of the
control room View of a
heavy gazole tank Gas plant
area after the accident
Managers’
responsibilities
An expert
witness claimed that the corrosion was foreseeable; leading to the conclusion
that management and maintenance were negligent.
In April
2002, a court found the then-President of Total guilty of involuntary
manslaughter and sentenced him to a suspended sentence of 18 months in prison
and a fine of 4500€. Two inspection managers (18 months suspended and 2500€),
two plant inspectors (4 months suspended and 1500€) were also sentenced.
Conclusion
Finally, as
in a lot of accidents, a combination of multiple factors leads to this terrible
ending. We propose here a list of lessons to be learned from this accident:
-
Build a blastproof control room, resistant to
shock waves, and locate it far from sensitive units.
Reinforce regulations about construction and
control of pipes and their accessories.
Keep enough space between units to avoid any
domino effect and to allow easier access to emergency services.
Increase the number of gas detectors,
positioned as close as possible to potential source of leakage to figure out the
presence of gas faster.
Install numerous sprinkler systems water
systems in “sensitive” areas to cool them down in case of fire in the unit.
Automate safety and security systems as far as
possible.
Sources :
Explosion de gaz dans les unités craquage
catalytique et gas plant d’une raffinerie, le 9 novembre 1992, Aria - Ministère
chargé de l'environnement, fiche juin 2008, available at http://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/ressources/fd_3969_lamede_version090608.pdf
who do you thinkk is responsible ?
ReplyDeleteBecause there should not be any agressive corrosion, the materials are normally adapted to the level of corrosion of the product that are used.
This means that a very corrosive charge was treated , which is the fault of the operating team !
The expert found that both management and maintenance was negligent.
ReplyDeleteThe choice of material was probably right but no systematic inspection was implemented.
Maintenace and supervision are important and serious issues to be taking into account operating the units.
According to Health And Safety Training Peterborough, there are two major reasons of accidents- leniency in the safety precaution and ignorance about the system.
ReplyDeleteRegards,
Arnold Brame